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This paper studies endogenous integration decisions of ﬁrms and its competitive
eﬀects in a complementary market setting where downstream ﬁrms sell a product
which must have a compatible variety of products that are supplied by upstream ﬁrms.
I present the conditions under which a downstream ﬁrm will prefer integrating with
an upstream ﬁrm, and conditions under a counter merger of ﬁrms occur. The analysis
shows that a vertical merger is more likely to occur whenever one of the upstream ﬁrm
is signiﬁcantly productive than the other. Competitive eﬀect of a integration of two
ﬁrms can lead to a counter integration of rivals post integration. Counter integration
is likely whenever both upstream ﬁrms are highly productive. In addition to a vertical
merger and two vertical mergers, contracting under independent ownership can also
be the method of procuring. As a result, no integration activity can be observed. The
results are obtained in a general two downstream ﬁrms and two upstream ﬁrms market
setting that allows eﬃcient compatibility contracts between upstream and downstream
producers.
Keywords:Endogenous Vertical Integration, Positive Externality, Complementary
Products, Product Variety JEL Classiﬁcations: D21, L22, L4
1 Introduction
The mergers and acquisitions literature has examined how a price of a product or market
concentration is aﬀected post mergers, such as vertical integration or horizontal merger, to
understand the competitive eﬀects not only on the participant ﬁrms, but also on ﬁrms that
are excluded from the merger. A typical assumption in most of the existing literature is
that, the type of merger structured by participant ﬁrms is exogenous. However, a merger
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1is a type of contract that must be agreed on by the both participant ﬁrms; thus mergers
are strategic decisions. For example, when a ﬁrm decides to acquire a supplier to enhance
its product quality, both the ﬁrm and the supplier assess the value of the merger before
any executive decisions are made. The ﬁrms may or may not agree on the merger under
the current conditions or future conditions which will arise post merger. Moreover, the
merger proposed by a ﬁrm aﬀects the excluded ﬁrms’ ex post incentives to do business with
the merged ﬁrm. The purpose of this paper is to study how diﬀerent type of mergers or
sequence of mergers can be explained in complementary markets when the merger decision
is endogenous. In addition, the paper examines the competitive eﬀect(s) of a merger on
compatibility and supply decisions.
Particularly, I consider a model where downstream ﬁrms sell a product which must
be supported with a compatible variety of products that are supplied by an upstream
ﬁrm. In this setting, downstream ﬁrms product does not have any value unless it is
supported by a set of compatible products. A downstream ﬁrm can integrate or maintain
contractual relations with an upstream ﬁrm. The timing of the game is as follows: ﬁrst,
a downstream ﬁrm announces whether to integrate or not with an upstream ﬁrm; after
observing the new market structure, an excluded downstream ﬁrm can counter integrate
with the remaining upstream ﬁrm if a vertical integration occurred in the ﬁrst stage. Then,
each downstream ﬁrm that is not integrated with an upstream ﬁrm oﬀers a compatibility
contract to one of the upstream ﬁrms, while integrated ﬁrms will be supplied internally.
Based on the contracts that are oﬀered, upstream ﬁrms determine whether to produce
compatible products. Then, each upstream ﬁrm, which agrees on a compatibility contract
commits to a ﬁrm speciﬁc research and development investment that can enhances the
upstream production. Finally ﬁrms compete and prices are determined.
If a downstream ﬁrm decides to integrate with an upstream supplier, remaining inde-
pendent downstream ﬁrm may oﬀer a contractual relation with the upstream division of
the integrated ﬁrm even though two ﬁrms compete in the downstream market. On the
other hand, an integration can also lead to a counter integration which will stiﬀen the
downstream competition. A downstream ﬁrm’s objective is to structure an organizational
form that increases its expected proﬁts. The optimal decision of a downstream ﬁrm in the
complementary market setting is the focus of this paper.
In order to study this problem, I adopt Heavner’s (2004) reduced form proﬁt frame-
work.1 Heavner shows that, under some conditions, ﬁrms may remain independently
owned because an integrated ﬁrm can not commit to supplying a better quality of a
product for its downstream competitor when integration is the only alternative for the
downstream ﬁrm and no counter integration is allowed. When counter integration is pos-
1In his reduced form setting, a ﬁrm’s proﬁt only depends on the quality its product and the quality of
competitor’s product.
2sible, however, a downstream ﬁrm faces an additional consequence: an integration may
also trigger a counter integration which makes the integration more costly ex ante.
An immediate ﬁnding of this paper is that a downstream ﬁrm’s incentive to integrate
with an upstream ﬁrm increases as productivity gap between the upstream ﬁrms increases.
To see this, consider a setting with two downstream ﬁrms and a very high productivity
upstream ﬁrm Uh, and very low productivity upstream ﬁrm Ul. First, the downstream
ﬁrm D1 decides to integrate with Uh, and then the other downstream ﬁrm D2 considers
whether to oﬀer a compatibility contract to the upstream division of the integrated ﬁrm
or integrate with Ul. If the productivity of Uh is very high, a counter integration decision
of D2 is unlikely to change the integration decision of D1. That’s why, D2 can not be
an ex ante threat to D1 in the downstream market. When D2,Ul counter integrate, D2
will be supplied with less enhanced products by Ul than the case which D2 maintains
a contractual relation with Uh post D1,Uh integration. In contrast, if D2 extends a
contract to the upstream division Uh of the integrated ﬁrm, D2 will be supplied by more
enhanced products even though the integrated ﬁrm has the incentive to invest less for
its downstream competitor. On the other hand, it might be the case that D2 will be
a tougher competitor to the downstream division D1 of the integrated ﬁrm if it signs a
contract with the upstream division Uh. In this case, integrated ﬁrm either would not
agree on a compatibility contract or would not invest for its downstream competitor. This
is valid in a general setting as well.
Following this observation, an integration of a downstream and an upstream ﬁrm will
be the equilibrium outcome if one of the upstream ﬁrms is highly productive than other.
I present conditions under which only one of the downstream ﬁrms integrates with an
upstream ﬁrm, conditions under which a counter merger will be observed, and conditions
under which downstream and upstream ﬁrms are better oﬀ with only contractual relations.
This paper contributes to the mergers and acquisitions literature with endogenous
merger decision and can be a theoretical basis to the existing literature on mark-up analysis
after diﬀerent types of mergers. Most of the existing literature assumes that an integration
decision is exogenous and analyzed the equilibrium mark-up or welfare eﬀects. In contrast,
endogenous integration decision is analyzed in this paper: downstream ﬁrms can choose
which ﬁrm to acquire prior to any business contracts or price competition. The market
structure I study is quite general. In my model, I allow downstream ﬁrms to contract with
or to acquire a complementary good producer.
To illustrate the model, I ﬁrst study endogenous integration decision with a vertical
merger option and no counter merger. A downstream ﬁrm either can integrate with an
upstream ﬁrm or can contract with an upstream ﬁrm. An integrated downstream ﬁrm’s
proﬁt is contingent upon the compatibility decisions. An integrated ﬁrm can acquire an
eﬃcient contract from an independent downstream ﬁrm. The downstream proﬁts depend
3on the variety of its complementary product and variety of its downstream competitor’s
complementary product.
A downstream ﬁrm and an upstream ﬁrm may have conﬂicting interests in the merger
because an upstream ﬁrm incurs the investment cost but may have to give up the business
of the independent downstream ﬁrm. On the other hand, the downstream ﬁrm increases
its variety of complementary products post integration. Moreover, an integrated down-
stream ﬁrm can solve that its competitor will be supplied by less variety of complementary
products if downstream competitor extends a contract to the upstream division of the in-
tegrated ﬁrm ex post. Therefore, integration decision is a strategic decision for both the
downstream ﬁrm and upstream ﬁrm.
Intuitively, it may seem that a more productive upstream ﬁrm always gives a down-
stream ﬁrm a higher incentive to integrate because the downstream ﬁrm always prefers
being compatible with more eﬃcient supplier. However, this kind of thinking is wrong
because the downstream ﬁrm’s incentive to acquire the upstream ﬁrm depends on his
relative gain from integration rather than its complete gain. The marginal downstream
proﬁts post integration increases as the productivity asymmetry between upstream pro-
ducers increases.
In this setting, the equilibrium outcome depends on not only the production asym-
metries of upstream ﬁrms, but also independent downstream ﬁrms contractual relations.
The following is the reason. If independent upstream ﬁrm can produce enough variety of
complementary products to independent downstream ﬁrm after integration, the upstream
division of the integrated ﬁrm can not acquire the business of the its downstream com-
petitor. The independent downstream ﬁrm can extend a compatibility contract to the less
productive upstream ﬁrm because upstream division of the integrated ﬁrm would invest
less for its competitor in order to induce the complementary product variety of its down-
stream competitor. The upstream ﬁrm that is a candidate for an integration can loose
the business of the independent downstream ﬁrm and loose proﬁts. That’s why partici-
pant ﬁrms may forego an integration. On the other hand, if independent upstream ﬁrm
can not produce enough variety of complementary products to independent downstream
ﬁrm after integration, vertical integration can not possibly hurt the participant ﬁrms’ ex
post proﬁts. Again, the upstream division of the integrated ﬁrm will invest less for its
downstream competitor, but this time the integrated ﬁrm still acquires the business of its
downstream competitor.
To summarize, the basic model that allows for only a vertical merger has two main ﬁnd-
ings. First, the downstream ﬁrm’s incentive to acquire the upstream ﬁrm is higher when
the production asymmetry is higher, in other words, when the participant upstream ﬁrm
becomes more and more productive than the excluded one. Second, with compatibility
decision of the independent downstream ﬁrm, participant parties may forego an integra-
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price competition is more subtle and complicated because each upstream ﬁrm competes
and adjusts its downstream ﬁrm speciﬁc investment in order to attract downstream ﬁrms.
With an outside option for an upstream ﬁrm, the optimal upstream price can be pointed
out from the value of the outside option.
In order to analyze a more generalized model which includes a counter merger, I
ﬁrst provide suﬃcient conditions under which a downstream ﬁrm beneﬁts from a vertical
integration. Second, I analyzed that, under the suﬃcient conditions provided, whether
an integration is still the equilibrium outcome whenever counter merge is also possible. I
provided the suﬃcient conditions under which one integration or two integrations will be
observed in the market. Finally, I map each of diﬀerent complementary market setting,
which are characterized by upstream productivity, to a market structure outcome.
1.1 A Complementary Market
One of the biggest and fast growing markets in which complementarity exists is the video
game console market. In 1984, the home video game market crashed and thus, many
hardware and software game manufacturers, such as Apollo, US Games, Spectravision,
declared bankruptcy. However, Sega is acquired by investors and re-launched as a software
producer in U.S. One year later, Nintendo released its ﬁrst home video game system. In
1986, Sega decided to launch its Sega Master System and the system was supplied by
Sega itself. On the other hand, Atari released its own video game system that features
backward compatibility so that Atari could increase the number of titles available to its
new video game system.
In the following years, Atari, Nintendo and Sega launched new versions of their home
video game systems. In 1994, Sony launched its ﬁrst home video game system, PlaySta-
tion. Sony’s Playstation was going to be supported by independent software developers.
The corporation agreed to pay a share of the game softwares revenues to independent
software suppliers. Consequently, Playstation increased the number software titles which
are exclusive to Sony’s console Playstation in the console market. At the end of the third
business year, Sony Corporation increased its market share to almost 50% in the home
video game market. In 2000, Sony launched a backward compatible new home video game
system, PS2. The same year video game industry grew 30%. At the end of 2000, Sony Cor-
poration announced that its 50% of proﬁts was generated by PlayStation although only
15% of Sony’s total revenue is generated by PlayStation sales. Eventually, the console
market consolidated and Atari was acquired by Sega systems.
In 2001, Microsoft decided to launch a new video game system, however, the corpora-
tion’s main concern was the high variety of game softwares that are exclusive to Sony’s
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Sony’s PS2 had. As a market solution, Microsoft adopted a strategy of acquisition of some
independently owned software ﬁrms. The corporation started to create a portfolio of its
own game softwares that are developed under the name of the company.2 On the other
hand, Sega decided to exit the market, nevertheless, the ﬁrm resumed producing game
softwares for the rival console producers.
Recently, Nintendo, Microsoft and Sony launched their next generation of video game
consoles, Wii, XBOX 360 and PS3 respectively. DFC Intelligence’s research on game
industry reports that there has been a strong sales increase in the video game market over
the past few years and there is still plenty of room for growth. The report also indicates
that the generation who grew up with Atari and Nintendo is switching to Microsoft and
Sony. The report suggests that an industry consolidation, which has not yet occurred as
many as predicted, is on its way. A merger an acquisition wave is expected between the
biggest game software producers and the biggest home video game console producers.3
2 Related Literature
This paper is related to the literature on mergers & acquisitions, competitive eﬀects of
mergers and complementarity & compatibility . First of all, I am presenting a more general
framework than the existing literature has. Each of the papers from existing literature
considers a special case. In my modeling framework, each of these special cases corresponds
to a diﬀerent set of underlying parameters in the paper. Second, my analysis also related
with the studies on competitive eﬀects in given merger types. Finally, this paper is close
to the existing literature on competition among complementary products.
The ﬁrst set of literature related to this work studies compatibility decisions in com-
plementary markets. Matutes & Regibeau (1988) examines a two stage game in which
two fully integrated ﬁrms make their compatibility decisions before competing in prices.
They found that full compatibility is the symmetric perfect Nash equilibrium which leads
to higher prices and also increases the variety of systems. This paper assumes the ﬁrms
are fully integrated. Economides & Salop (1992) analyzes the competition and integration
among complementary products that can be combined to create composite goods or sys-
tems. The model generalizes the Cournot duopoly complements model and analyzes the
2The recent Halo 2 is a tremendous hit and generated over $300,000,000 revenue. Microsoft announced
that the latest Halo installment is available. GameSpot reported that 4.2 million units of Halo 3 were in
retail outlets on September 24, 2007, a day before oﬃcial release, a world record volume release. Halo 3
also holds the record for the highest grossing opening day in entertainment history, making US$170 million
in its ﬁrst 24 hours,[9] and US$300 million in its ﬁrst week.
3Nintendo, Sega, EA, Acclaim and Capcom are ﬁve biggest software producers. Microsoft, Sony, Nin-
tendo are three biggest home video game producers.
6equilibrium prices for a variety of organizational and market structures. They solve the
Nash equilibrium prices for diﬀerent types of market structures such as vertical integration,
horizontal merger, conglomerate merger. Gandal & Kende and Rob (2000) examines the
inﬂuence of the diﬀerent titles of CD on the CD industry. They estimated the elasticity of
buying a hardware with respect to CD player prices and the cross elasticity with respect
to the variety of CD titles. They showed that the inﬂuence of the variety is signiﬁcant
and there is a positive relationship between the proﬁts of a ﬁrm and the total variety of
the ﬁrm’s complementary product. They assume that the software industry is compet-
itive and there exists no vertical or horizontal integration in the market. These models
examine similar market structures with the one this paper analyzes and focus on inﬂuence
of complementarities on prices, but the market structures are taken as granted unlike my
model which studies the endogenous merger decisions. In each of these papers, certain
types of merger and contractual relationship are ruled out by assumption.
A second branch of the literature studies vertical mergers. Beggs(1994) examines com-
petition between groups of ﬁrms selling products which are complementary within the
group but substitutes across groups, such as components of diﬀerent computer systems.
The paper shows that ﬁrms within a group will often prefer to stay as separate companies
rather than merge. McAfee(1999) analyzes the reaction of the other input suppliers to
vertical integration. In his paper, he examines the price competition in input market post
integration and the competitive eﬀects of a vertical merger. The paper shows the input
suppliers may reduce the its rival’s cost instead of raising the input cost. Chen(2001)
shows how the pricing incentive of a downstream producer and the incentive of a com-
petitor in choosing input suppliers is eﬀected by vertical integration. The paper develops
an equilibrium theory of vertical merger which can provide a framework in which the
competitive eﬀects of vertical mergers are measured and compared. Heavner(2004) ex-
amines integrating ﬁrms’ trading opportunities post integration. The model analyzes the
integration decision of a downstream ﬁrm if downstream units must commit to suppliers
before contracting on the ﬁnal terms of trade. The paper shows integration can alter the
supplier decisions of upstream units. As a result, ﬁrms may remain independently owned.
In addition to Heavner (2004), the current paper studies the merger decision whenever
counter merger and horizontal merger are also possible.
In the literature, the organizational forms are often taken for granted. The organiza-
tional forms that are included in the models can be summarized as
7Vertical Integration Counter Merger Contractual Relations
Matutes & Regibeau (1988) Assumes Assumes Away Assumes
Economides & Salop (1992) Assumes Assumes Assumes
Gandal & Rob & Kende (2000) Assumes Away Assumes Away Assumes
Beggs (1994) Assumes Assumes Away Assumes
McAfee(1999) Assumes Assumes Away Assumes
Chen (2001) Assumes Assumes Assumes
Heavner (2004) Assumes Assumes Away Assumes
Unlike some of these papers, this paper identiﬁes the conditions under which vertical
merger, a counter merger or contracting is the only equilibrium organizational form. My
paper falls into the same category as Chen(2001) & Heavner(2004). Diﬀerent than those,
the analysis considers a market setting in which downstream and upstream ﬁrms produce
complementary goods. As RGK(2000) suggested, my paper takes the variety eﬀect into
account in merger decision analysis. This paper provides an equilibrium theory of organi-
zational forms which can explain why diﬀerent types of mergers can be observed. Vertical
merger, a counter merger and contracting can all be organizational forms in equilibrium.
This paper can provide the underlying framework for Economides & Salop paper and the
merger literature which take the merger types for granted.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model.
Section 3 is the analysis of the model with no counter integration. Section 4 contains the
analysis of endogenous integration decision with counter merger. Section 5 discusses the
welfare eﬀects. Section 6 summarizes and concludes. All proofs are relegated to Appendix.
3 The Model
The model consists of two downstream ﬁrms (D1&D2) which produce a ”Base Product”
and two upstream ﬁrms (U1&U2) which produce ”Side Products”. Consumers need to
buy a base product in order to utilize the side products, i.e. the products are perfect
complements in the market. Thus, a downstream ﬁrm has to be supported by a variety
of a side products which must be compatible with the base product. Each upstream ﬁrm
develops a variety of a complementary good which will be compatible with a downstream
ﬁrm’s product. The variety depends on a ﬁrm speciﬁc R&D investment of an upstream
ﬁrm for a downstream ﬁrm, and how eﬃcient the upstream ﬁrm’s production is.
An upstream ﬁrm, which signs a compatibility contract with a downstream ﬁrm, will
choose a ﬁrm speciﬁc investment level to supply some variety of goods for its compatible
base product. If Ui is compatible with Dj then the upstream ﬁrm supplies the variety vj
8to Dj where,
vj = εi + τ(rij)
A downstream ﬁrm speciﬁc variety is determined by three factors: First, downstream
ﬁrm Dj speciﬁc R&D investment rij of upstream ﬁrm Ui, second, upstream production
technology τ(r), and third upstream ﬁrm Ui’s production eﬃciency εi.4 The amount of
variety an upstream ﬁrm could supply when the upstream ﬁrm has no R&D investment
deﬁnes the eﬃciency parameter ε of the upstream ﬁrm. In particular, {εi}i=1,2 is the
parameter space that characterizes diﬀerent market schemes and generates the diﬀerent
results of the model. The cost of launching vj upstream product is the level of investment
(rij) that the upstream ﬁrm Ui invests for its compatible Dj.
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Variety can be regarded as the number of diﬀerent accessories that are available for a
downstream product in the market.5 Variety can also have diﬀerent aspects, such as the
quality among the various upstream products or how well the upstream ﬁrm’s distribution
in the market. Another point of view can be that variety may be considered as the quality
of an upstream ﬁrm’s product. The model analyzes variety as a scalar term, however it
could be also represented as a vector.6
Both upstream ﬁrms and downstream ﬁrms are independently owned prior to any
merger decision. Each independently owned ﬁrm maximizes its own proﬁt. In case of a
merger, the merged entity will have one central management which makes the production
decision in order to maximize the merged entity’s proﬁt. I am interested in the endogenous
merger decision of downstream ﬁrms.
One vertical integration, which is D1,U1 to merge and D2,U2 to remain independent,
will be observed in the market if post integration proﬁt of the integrated ﬁrm Uv
1D1 is
greater than the sum of independently owned D1’s and U1’s proﬁts before the integration
and proﬁt of the integrated ﬁrm Uv
2D2 would be less than sum of independently owned
D2’s and U2’s proﬁts post integration.
Π(Uv
1D1) > Π(U1) + Π(D1) and Π(U2) + Π(D2) > Π(Uv
2D2)
On the other hand, one vertical integration and a counter integration, which is D1,U1
to merge and D2,U2 to merge, will be observed in the market if post integration proﬁt of
4τ(r) can be interpreted as the production function which satisﬁes diminishing marginal return.
5For instance, diﬀerent game titles for Sony’s Playstation or diﬀerent accessories that are available to
Apple’s IPod.
6Variety also can have other attributes such as popularity in the market which has the impact on both
the sale performance and the durability of a side product.
9the integrated ﬁrm Uv
1D1 is greater than the sum of independently owned D1’s and U1’s
proﬁts before the integration and proﬁt of the integrated ﬁrm Uv
2D2 would be greater than
sum of independently owned D2’s and U2’s proﬁts post integration.
Π(Uv
1D1) > Π(U1) + Π(D1) and Π(Uv
2D2) > Π(U2) + Π(D2) given
Finally, there will be only contractual relations between upstream and downstream
ﬁrms if a downstream ﬁrms would not beneﬁt from a vertical integration. Independently
downstream ﬁrms will contract with independently owned upstream ﬁrms.
I study the endogenous integration decision of a downstream ﬁrm by solving the sub-
game perfect Nash equilibrium in a setting in which the ﬁrm must decide to merge or
not before any investment or compatibility decisions made in the market. At time zero,
D1 has to decide on a merger strategy.7 The downstream ﬁrm can integrate with U1. In
case of vertical integration, the integrated ﬁrm will produce both a base product and side
products that are compatible with its base product. On the other hand, if D1 decides to
merge with D2, then the merged ﬁrm will be the only base product supplier in the market.
In case of independent D1, D1 produces a base product and oﬀers compatibility contract
to either of the side product ﬁrms to be compatible with its base product.
At time one, D2 may counter integrate with U2 if D1 integrated with U1 at time
zero. At time two, each independently owned downstream ﬁrm oﬀers a compatibility
contract to one supplier. A downstream unit of an integrated ﬁrm will be supplied by
the upstream division of the integrated ﬁrm. Upstream ﬁrms (or divisions) observe the
oﬀers and decide whether to be compatible with the downstream ﬁrm or not. At time
three, if an upstream ﬁrm decides to be compatible with a downstream ﬁrm, then the
upstream ﬁrm will invest on ﬁrm speciﬁc R&D to establish a variety of the side products
for its compatible downstream product. The ﬁrm speciﬁc R&D investment will determine
the variety of the side products. At time four, upstream ﬁrms announce and launch the
products they have developed. The variety of the side products is going to be observed and
ﬁrms will compete in the market. The ﬁgure illustrates the timing of the model. The left
section describes the model when there is a vertical merger. The middle section describes
in case of a counter merger. The right section describes when there is only contractual
relations.
7Aaker considered the market strategy of a ﬁrm in two parts. According to him, a ﬁrm can expand
its product market by increasing his market share or a ﬁrm can vertically integrate by either forward
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Figure 1: Timeline
This paper examines a setting in which the upstream ﬁrms can not alter their supply
decision. That is, the investment decision of the upstream ﬁrms is a one time decision
instead of series of decisions. However, sometimes, the producers increase the variety of a
product by adding components which enhances the obsolete upstream products. On the
other hand, It is unlikely for ﬁrms to forecast the enhancements in the future prior to any
investment decision.8
8The Sony Corporation never expected that Grand Theft Auto, one of Sony’s PlayStation title, will be
a tremendous hit. Independently owned Electronic Arts, a game developer, launched various extensions of
the title which increased the PS2 hit titles in the market
11Downstream proﬁts are assumed as reduced form functions such that the downstream
ﬁrm Dj’s proﬁt Π(Dj) is the equilibrium proﬁt function for a subgame where ﬁrms compete
on price
ΠDj = π + αvj − µvi where µ ∈ [0,1] and α = 1 − β
A compatibility decision between an upstream ﬁrm Ui and an downstream ﬁrm Dj
increases the downstream proﬁts by vi. If Ui and Dj do not integrate, Dj pays a share of
its gain, βvj, to its compatible upstream ﬁrm as a contract fee where β ∈ [0.1]. 9 One way
to think β as just a sharing parameter which is exogenous. The other way is that, without
loss of generality, we can assume that the downstream ﬁrms have the bargaining power
over the upstream ﬁrms. U1 and U2 are ex ante identical but ex post diﬀerent. That’s
why, downstream producers can hold the upstream suppliers to their opportunity costs.
Hence they can have the same opportunity cost to outside opportunities, but diﬀerent
productivity in this market.
The sensitivity Ui’s and Dj’s revenues to Dj’ s variety whenever Ui supplies to Dj
is measured by the parameter β. In equilibrium, β depends on the outside options of
the upstream ﬁrms. We can think β as a market price per variety for given varieties to
cover upstream ﬁrms’ opportunity cost. In many markets, the expected value of an always
available outside option for a ﬁrm can be determined. Each ﬁrm would have the same ex-
pected outside option, especially when they have signiﬁcantly close production eﬃciencies.
One can do a ”local” analysis along the eﬃciency parameter with same expected outside
options from diﬀerent random draws for their market. In particular, this is true even if U1
and U2 draw diﬀerent values of ε1 and ε2 in their particular market. This paper assumes
that downstream ﬁrms have all the bargaining power that’s why β can be determined by
the outside option, θ, which is exogenous. 10
For better exposition purposes, I will assume β ∈ [µ,2µ]. However the assumption
would not change many results. The assumption suggests that any integrated ﬁrm would
supply to an independently owned downstream ﬁrm. If β < µ, then the integrated ﬁrm
would supply zero to an independently owned downstream ﬁrm. However, there may exist
β and µ such that β < µ. One must be aware that,there might be a region of (ε1,ε2) in
which no merger activity happens at all. Moreover, the assumption suggests that the price
of an upstream ﬁrm is not too high that would harm a downstream ﬁrm, i.e. β < 2µ.11
That’s why I am going to assume β ∈ [µ,2µ] for better exposition of the results.
Downstream proﬁts depend on a ﬁxed term π, variety of the ﬁrm vi and variety of
9Heavner(2004) suggested that 50/50 bargaining rule implies that upstream and downstream ﬁrms
share the proﬁt vj. i.e. α = 1 − β = β = 1/2.
10In perfectly competitive markets,p=MC
11The assumption also suggests that outside option of an upstream ﬁrm is not high.
12a downstream competitor vj, and the sensitivity measures β and µ. 12 The exogenous
parameter µ measures the sensitivity of Di’s revenues to Dj’s variety.13
Reduced form of downstream proﬁt functions come from a pricing game (given vari-
eties) such that each downstream product’s demand is
Qi(pi,pj) = A + vi − pi + δ(pj − vj) i,j = 1,2
where vi i = 1,2 is the variety of upstream products that are supplied by a contracted
upstream ﬁrm. The proﬁt of a downstream ﬁrm that conﬁrms a compatibility contract
with an upstream ﬁrm Ujis
Π(Di;Uj) = (pi − ci)Qi(pi,pj) − C(β,vj) i = 1,2
where ci is the marginal cost of production and C(β,vj) is the cost of acquiring side
products from an upstream ﬁrm. C(β,vj) = cvj is the payment that a downstream ﬁrm
must make to sign a compatibility contract with an upstream ﬁrm.
The unique Nash equilibrium exists for the relevant δ ∈ (0,1) and the equilibrium
prices and proﬁts are,
pi(vi;v−i) =
A(2 + δ) + (2 − δ2)vi − δv−i
4 − δ2






(2 − δ2)v1 − δv2
4 − δ2
The downstream proﬁt function is increasing in its variety and decreasing in competitor’s
variety. As a result, downstream proﬁt functions can be represented by the reduced form
functions Π(Dj) = π + αvj − µvi that carries the same characteristics. The constant
number π depends on the demand variables A and λ. The reduced form enables me to
avoid any complex price analysis which has done in the literature quite often.14
The proﬁt function of a upstream ﬁrm depends on the variety the ﬁrm supplies to the
market and its R&D cost.
ΠU1 = Σjλj(βvj − r1j)
ΠU2 = Σj(1 − λj)(βvj − r2j), j = 1,2
12α = 1 − β represents the externality eﬀect which is proven in Gandal & Kende and Rob (2000).
13One way that µ could measure the sensitivity of Di’s revenues to Dj’s variety is if the elasticity of
demand for Di’s product with respect to price per unit of variety of Dj’s product is increasing in µ, i.e.






13λj is an indicator function which is positive when U1 is compatible with Dj and which
is zero when U2 is compatible with Dj.15 β is a measure of the marginal upstream proﬁt
increase due to a variety eﬀect in the market.
In case of a vertical integration, the integrated ﬁrm’s proﬁt is the combined proﬁts of
upstream and downstream divisions.
Π(Dv
i Uj) = π + vi − µvj − rv + λj(βvj − rij)
rv is the investment of the upstream division for the downstream division and λj is an
indicator function which is positive when the independent downstream ﬁrm is compatible
with Dv
i Uj and which is zero when the independent downstream ﬁrm is compatible with
the independent upstream ﬁrm.
3.1 Discussion
This paper analyzes a value added model of downstream and upstream ﬁrms. In the model,
the added value is represented by the term variety, vj = εi+τ(rij), which is a characteristic
of a downstream ﬁrm that is supplied by an upstream ﬁrm. The added value is modeled
with a ﬁxed eﬀect ε, which is speciﬁc for each upstream ﬁrm, and technology function.16.
My paper constructs a theory of mergers on Gandal & Rob and Kende (2000). GRK
studied a model of ﬁxed eﬀects. However, they take the number of titles as an exogenous
value from the data they used. They utilized the number of titles as a proxy to estimate
the price and cross price elasticities of the proﬁt function. 17 The ﬁxed eﬀect model
controls for the diﬀerences between upstream suppliers. A ﬁxed eﬀect model is plausible
in many industries in which the suppliers (upstream) has the same cost structure but
diﬀerent production capacities (Qualities). Telecommunication industry (AT&T, Lucent
Technologies), video game console industry (EA, Konami, Sega) can be some examples.
One can argue a downstream and upstream speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀect. Modeling εij instead of εi
is not plausible because ε1 and ε2 is the production characteristics of upstream ﬁrms. The
production eﬃciency of a producer can not depend on any eﬃcient contract. In addition,
the parameter space (ε1,ε2) infers U1’s technological advantage or disadvantage relative to
U2. The model has an empirical implication. A structural model which estimates elasticity
values of a log proﬁt function by analyzing vi as a proxy whenever the data contains the
number of diﬀerent titles associated with a downstream product and the supplier’s cost
in the upstream market. The empirical model can forecast a wave of mergers in a well
structured complementary market. The next section starts analyzing the ﬁxed eﬀect model
of endogenous integration decision when rival ﬁrms can not possibly counter integrate.
15Dj can be compatible with either U1 or U2
16Heavner (2004) also studies an added value model
17(Π = π + α1vi + α−1Y where vi is exogenous)
144 Endogenous Integration Decision with No Counter Inte-
gration of Rivals
The following sections analyze the determinants of integration and contractual decisions
conditional on certain aspects of organizational choice being ascended away. The ﬁrst
part analyzes the integration decision under the assumptions U2 and D2 can not counter
integrate. The following section analyzes the endogenous integration decision when the
market rivals U2 and D2 can also integrate.
This section imposes two restrictions on the model. First, only one downstream ﬁrm
may integrate with an upstream ﬁrm and two downstream ﬁrms can not merge. Second,
remaining independent downstream and upstream ﬁrms can not counter merge. Thus, the
section analyzes the integration decision of D1 and U1 in a setting in which D2 and U2 can
not integrate as a market reaction. D2 may preserve its contractual relations with either
the new integrated ﬁrm or remaining upstream ﬁrm U2 post integration.
Upstream ﬁrms U1 and U2 are not necessarily symmetric. A downstream ﬁrm would
extend a compatibility contract to an upstream ﬁrm if the return of the option is the
highest. If Π(Di;Uj) denotes the proﬁt of downstream ﬁrm Di which contracts with
upstream ﬁrm Uj and Di ∼ Uj denotes that Di is compatible with Uj which suggests
upstream ﬁrm Uj will supply a variety of side products to Dj’s product, then
Dj ∼ U1 if Π(Dj;U1) > Π(Dj;U2)
Dj ∼ U2 if Π(Dj;U2) > Π(Dj;U1)
Before starting the analysis, one must determine a tie breaking rule that should explain
which of the independent upstream ﬁrms is going to be associated with an independent
downstream ﬁrm in case the proﬁts are equal. In this case, intuitively, a downstream ﬁrm
would oﬀer a compatibility contract to the upstream ﬁrm that is more eﬃcient. That’s
why, tie breaking rule favors the more eﬃcient upstream ﬁrm.
Dj ∼ U1 if ε1 ≥ ε2 & Π(Dj;U1) = Π(Dj;U2)
Dj ∼ U2 if ε2 > ε1 & Π(Dj;U1) = Π(Dj;U2) ,j = 1,2
The integration decision of D1 and U1 depends on two aspects. First, how proﬁtable
the new integrated ﬁrm can be in both upstream and downstream markets. Second, how
the downstream competitor will be supplied post integration. D1 and U1 integrate if the
proﬁt of the integrated ﬁrm is at least as high as the the sum of U1’s and D1’s proﬁts in
case of no integration. An integration can be foregone if the proﬁt of integration is less
than the individual proﬁts.
15I will follow rules of backward induction to analyze the endogenous integration decision
under the condition that no counter merger is allowed. The analysis presents the conditions
under which an integration is a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium. This section also
exposes the conditions under which ﬁrms can renounce vertical integration and maintain
only contractual relations.
If each ﬁrm decides to have a contractual agreement, each ﬁrm is going to maximize
its own proﬁt. Under independent ownership, the proﬁts are going to be,
18
Π(Dj;U) = π + αvj − µv−j ,j = 1,2
Π(U1) = λ1(βv1 − r11) + λ2(βv2 − r12)
Π(U2) = (1 − λ1)(βv1 − r21) + (1 − λ2)(βv2 − r22) ,(α,β) ∈ {(0,1)x(0,1) : α + β = 1}
λj is an indicator function which is determined by the compatibility agreements be-
tween the downstream and upstream ﬁrms. It is positive if the Dj is compatible with U1
(λj = 1). The downstream ﬁrm can oﬀer a contract to only one upstream ﬁrm, so the Dj
would oﬀer a contract to U2 if the ﬁrm did not oﬀer to U1(λj = 0). Thus, U1’s goal is to
maximize proﬁt. That is,
max
r11,r12
λ1(β(ε1 + τ(r11)) − r11) + λ2(β(ε1 + τ(r12)) − r12) (1)





(r1i) − 1 = 0 (2)
U1’s optimal investment level which maximizes its proﬁt is r1j = γ(β−1) if λj is positive,
where γ(x) is the inverse function of the derivative of the investment function, i.e. γ(x) =
τ
0−1(x).
As a result, the optimal investment rij depends on two factors: Marginal product of in-
vestment and the sensitivity Ui’s revenue to Dj’s variety. Marginal product of investment,
τ
0
(x), is a decreasing function and so γ(x) is. That’s why, the Dj’s variety increases as the
value of upstream ﬁrms’ outside option increases because revenue sensitivity parameter β
increases as the outside option’s value increases. If no merger occurs in the market, U2
solves a similar proﬁt maximization problem, and chooses a ﬁrm speciﬁc investment level
r∗
2i = τ
0−1(β−1) whenever Di is compatible with U2.19 Any upstream ﬁrms agrees on a
compatibility contract if the net gain from the contract will be positive. 20
18λ1 = 1 if D1 ∼ U1, λ1 = 0 if D1 ∼ U2, λ2 = 1 if D2 ∼ U1, λ2 = 0 if D2 ∼ U2
19If we allow εi to be negative as well , then an independently owned upstream ﬁrm accepts a compati-







16Moreover, downstream ﬁrms’ contractual relations must maximize their proﬁts. Thus,
an independent downstream ﬁrm’s main goal is to be supported by as various side products
as possible, which necessarily maximizes its proﬁt. In particular, a downstream ﬁrm would
extend a compatibility contract to the upstream ﬁrm which can commit to supply the most
variety.
At the time, each downstream ﬁrm prefers contracting with the upstream ﬁrm which
has more eﬃcient productivity. Thus, being ε1 greater than ε2 leads D1 and D2 to extend a
contract to U1; while, D1 and D2 extend a compatibility contract to U2 if ε2 is greater than
ε1. Moreover, comparing the upstream proﬁts shows that both U1 and U2 prefer accepting
as many compatibility contracts as possible.21 Lemma 1 summarizes the equilibrium
compatibility contracts when U1 and D1 are independent.
Lemma 1. Assume that
(A1) Upstream ﬁrms are independently owned
(A2) Downstream ﬁrms are independently owned
Both downstream ﬁrms extend a compatibility contract oﬀer to the more eﬃcient upstream
ﬁrm. The more eﬃcient upstream ﬁrm accepts the downstream ﬁrms’ contract oﬀers.
Should no upstream ﬁrm and downstream ﬁrm merge, downstream producers oﬀer
compatibility contract to the more eﬃcient upstream ﬁrm. The more eﬃcient upstream
ﬁrm can supply more variety than the less eﬃcient one which necessarily increases down-
stream proﬁts. Hence, the only supplier in the market will be the more eﬃcient upstream
ﬁrm in any equilibrium in which no downstream ﬁrm integrate with an upstream ﬁrm.
Next, I will analyze the equilibrium compatibility contracts when U1 and D1 are inte-
grated. The integration decision of two ﬁrms does not have any aﬀect on the remaining
independent upstream ﬁrm U2’s gain from any compatibility contracts. That’s why, the
integration decision of U1,D1 does not aﬀect U2’s ﬁrm speciﬁc optimal R&D investment
in case U2 is compatible with the remaining independent downstream ﬁrm D2.
Post integration, the upstream division U1 will supply for the downstream division
D1 without signing a compatibility contract. Vertical integration of ﬁrms has two eﬀects;
one direct eﬀect and one indirect eﬀect on the upstream division U1’s incentives. The
direct eﬀect is increasing the optimal R&D investment which increases the downstream
proﬁt of the integrated ﬁrm. Thus, the total variety supplied to its downstream division
will be higher post integration. The indirect eﬀect is being reluctant to invest for its
downstream competitor D2 in case D2 extends a compatibility contract to the upstream
division of the integrated ﬁrm. The integrated ﬁrm may increase its upstream proﬁts
and earn β(ε1 + τ(r12) − r12). On the other hand, the integrated ﬁrm can loose some of
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Figure 2: Compatibility Contracts under Independent Ownership
its downstream proﬁt if the upstream division supplies a high variety for D2 and loose
(µ(ε1 + τ(r12))). As a result, U1 will have less incentive to supply D2. Consequently,
this eﬀect increases D2’s incentives to extend a compatibility contract to the independent
upstream ﬁrm U2, even if U2 is less eﬃcient than U1
The proﬁt of Uv
1D1 will be
Π(Uv
1D1) = π + ε1 + τ(r11) − µ(ε2 + τ(r∗
22))) − r11 if D2 ∼ U2
Π(Uv
1D1;D2) = π + ε1 + τ(r11) + (β − µ)(ε1 + τ(r∗
12))) − r11 − r12 if D2 ∼ Uv
1D1
Since U1,D1 integration decision has no eﬀect on U2’s gain, U2 invests r∗
22 = γ(β−1) if D2





π + ε1 + τ(r11) − r11 − (1 − λ2)µ(ε2 + τ(γ(β−1))) + λ2((β − µ)(ε1 + τ(r12)) − r12)
U1 invests for D2 if the independent downstream ﬁrm extends a contract to the upstream
division of the integrated ﬁrm and the integrated ﬁrm accepts the contract. U1 invests
more for D1 post integration, whereas U1 will be more reluctant to invest for D2. Lemma
2 summarizes the equilibrium optimal investments when U1,D1 integrate.
18Lemma 2. Assume that
(A1) U1 and D1 merge
(A2) No counter merger
(A3) β > µ
If remaining independent downstream ﬁrm D2 signs a compatibility contract with the up-
stream division of the integrated ﬁrm, then the integrated ﬁrm invests r11 = γ(1) and
r12 = γ((β − µ)−1)
D2 will be supplied by U2 if the integrated ﬁrm does not accept the compatibility
contract from D2. In this case, D2 will be supplied by ε2 + τ(r∗
22). The integrated
ﬁrm agrees to be the supplier to its downstream competitor if the potential value of the
agreement is positive.
(β − µ)(ε1 + τ(γ((β − µ)−1))) − γ((β − µ)−1) ≥ −µ(ε2 + τ(γ(β−1))) if β > µ
(β − µ)ε1 ≥ −µ(ε2 + τ(γ(β−1))) if β < µ
The integrated ﬁrm will supply to its downstream competitor if there is an economic
gain. In other words, the integrated ﬁrm accepts to produce for D2 if the gain from
supplying, which are; a portion of D2’s sales, the competitive eﬀect and the cost of R&D,
is higher than the opportunity cost of not supplying, which is the competitive eﬀect when
U2 supplies D2. Lemma 3 summarizes the integrated ﬁrm’s compatibility decision with
D2 when U1,D1 integrate.
Lemma 3. Assume that
(A1) U1 and D1 merge
(A2) No counter merger
The integrated ﬁrm’s upstream division Uv
1D1 would supply for the remaining independent




















F2(µ,β) > 0 > F1(µ,β)
19That’s why, Uv
1D1 always agrees on compatibility contract with D1 whenever D2 ex-
tended a contract if β > µ. On the other hand, there may still be a positive economic
gain, although β < µ in the downstream market so that the integrated ﬁrm can agree on
a contract with its downstream competitor. However, the integrated ﬁrm would have no
incentive to invest for D2 since any positive investment would decrease the overall proﬁt.
Supplying D2 won’t have any aﬀect on U1’s incentives to supply D1. Post integration,
upstream division U1 invests more for downstream division D1 even if Uv
1D1 is compatible
with D2. In conclusion, the optimal level of U1’s investment for D1 is higher than the
optimal level of investment U1 has for the downstream competitor. Consequently, the in-
centive of the independent downstream ﬁrm D2 to be compatible with the integrated ﬁrm
is reduced due to the integrated ﬁrm’s unwillingness to invest for its competitor. Thus,
U1D1 integration increases the likelihood of D2 to be compatible with U2.
Post integration, the proﬁt function of the independent downstream ﬁrm D2 is,
If β > µ
Π(D2) = π + α(λ2(ε1 + τ(γ((β − µ)−1))) + (1 − λ2)(ε2 + τ(γ(β−1)))) − µ(ε1 + τ(γ(1)))
If β < µ
Π(D2) = π + α(λ2(ε1) + (1 − λ2)(ε2 + τ(γ(β−1)))) − µ(ε1 + τ(γ(1)))
D2 extends a compatibility contract to the integrated ﬁrm if
Π(D2;Uv
1D1) > Π(D2;U2)
Lemma 4 summarizes the D2’s equilibrium decision to be compatible with Uv
1D1 when
U1,D1 integrate.
Lemma 4. Assume that
(A1) U1 and D1 merge
(A2) No counter merger
The remaining independent downstream ﬁrm D2 oﬀers a compatibility contract to upstream
division of the integrated ﬁrm if and only if
ε1 − ε2 ≥ G1(β,µ) if β > µ (5)
ε1 − ε2 ≥ G2(β) if β < µ (6)
,where
G1(β,µ) = τ(γ(β−1)) − τ(γ((β − µ)−1)) (7)
G2(β) = τ(γ(β−1)) (8)
Otherwise, the downstream ﬁrm will oﬀer compatibility contract to the independent up-
stream ﬁrm U2.
20D2’s willingness to extend a compatibility contract to Uv
1D1 increases as the upstream
division U1’s relative eﬃciency to U2’s eﬃciency increases. D2 extends a contract to Uv
1D1
if the U1’s eﬃciency advantage is adequate. On the other hand, D2 oﬀers a compatibility
contract to U2 if U2 is more eﬃcient than U1 or adequate eﬃcient so that D2 will be
supplied with a higher variety post integration.
The analysis partitions the (ε1,ε2) parameter space into three diﬀerent strategic re-
gions.22
R1 = {(ε1,ε2) : ε1 +
µ
β − µ






− τ(γ((β − µ)−1))}
R2 = {(ε1,ε2) : ε1 − ε2 ≥ G1(β,µ) = τ(γ(β−1)) − τ(γ((β − µ)−1))}
R3 = {(ε1,ε2) : ε1 − ε2 ≥ 0}
Note that R2 ⊂ R3 and R2 ⊂ R1
ξ1 = {(ε1,ε2) : (ε1,ε2) ∈ R2}
ξ2 = {(ε1,ε2) : (ε1,ε2) ∈ R3 and (ε1,ε2) / ∈ R2}
ξ3 = {(ε1,ε2) : (ε1,ε2) / ∈ R3}
ξ1 is the ﬁrst strategic region. If (ε1,ε2) ∈ ξ1, then D2 oﬀers a compatibility contract to
Uv
1D1 because upstream division U1 has the eﬃciency superiority. Second strategic region
is ξ2. If (ε1,ε2) ∈ ξ2, then D2 oﬀers a compatibility contract to U2 even though upstream
division U1 has the eﬃciency superiority because the integrated ﬁrm would invest less for
its downstream competitor. The last strategic region is ξ3 in which U2’s eﬃciency is more
than U1’s. If (ε1,ε2) ∈ ξ3, D2 oﬀers a compatibility contract to U2. U1,D1’s integration
decision does not have any aﬀect on D2’s incentive to be compatible with U2 in ξ3.
Until this part, I have examined the equilibrium compatibility contracts given U1
and D1’s integration decision. The next part will examine the U1’s and D1’s integration
decision. For better exposition purposes, the rest of the paper assumes that β > µ.
If (ε1,ε2) ∈ ξ1, in which U1 has an eﬃciency superiority, then U1,D1’s integration
decision has no aﬀect on D2’s incentives. Both downstream ﬁrms will be compatible with
U1 when U1,D1 do not integrate. D2 will be supplied by U1 even when U1,D1 integrate.
Moreover, if (ε1,ε2) ∈ ξ2, both downstream ﬁrms will be compatible with U1 when
U1,D1 do not integrate but D2 will be supplied by U2 when U1,D1 integrate. U2 can
attract D2’s business post integration that’s why integration decision will change the
D2’s incentive to oﬀer a compatibility contract to U1. Should D2 compatible with the
22R2 ⊂ R1 since G1(β,µ) > F1(β,µ). The slope of the line that deﬁnes R1 is negative while the slope of
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Figure 3: Compatibility Contracts if Vertical Integration Occurs with No Counter Merger
upstream division U1, integration harms D2’s proﬁt because Uv
1D1 invests less for D2 post
integration. Hence, D2 can switch its ﬁrst choice supplier when U1,D1 integrate.
Furthermore, if (ε1,ε2) ∈ ξ3, both downstream ﬁrms will be compatible with U2 when
U1,D1 do not integrate. As a matter of fact, the willingness of D2’s to extend a compat-
ibility contract to U2 also can not be altered when U1,D1 integrate. Nevertheless, Uv
1D1
would accept an oﬀer from D2 if D2 oﬀered when U1,D1 integrate.
The analysis shows that for every ε1 < G1(β,µ) D2 will be compatible with U2 when
U1,D1 integrate. The upstream division U1’s eﬃciency ε1 must be at least G1(β,µ) to
attract D2. Note that Lemma 4 suggests that G1(β,µ) is increasing in µ. Hence, the
more competitive downstream market is (higher µ), the more eﬃcient the integrated ﬁrm
should be in order to alter D2’s incentives. In addition, a higher µ causes U2 to reduce
optimal level of investment that U1 has for D2. That’s why, a higher µ expands the region
ξ2 and shrinks the region ξ1.
Theorem 1. Assume that
(A1) No counter merger
(A2) No horizontal merger of downstream ﬁrms
If (ε1,ε2) ∈ ξ1, then U1 and D1 integrate. D2 is supplied by the upstream division U1.
Lemma 1 states that downstream ﬁrms oﬀer compatibility contract to U1 if (ε1,ε2) ∈
ξ1. Lemma 4 states that D2 is supplied by Uv
1D1 when U1,D1 integrate, if (ε1,ε2) ∈ ξ1.
Theorem 1 summarizes the ﬁrms’ strategy when U1 has an eﬃcient superiority over U2.
22As a result, U1,D1 integrate under the conditions because of both gain in upstream and
downstream markets. D2 extends a contract oﬀer to Uv
1D1 since integration decision of
U1,D1 does not aﬀect D2’s incentives. To summarize, D1 and U1 integrate in ξ1 if no
counter merger and no horizontal merger of downstream ﬁrms are allowed.
Next, U1,D1’s integration decision can alter the D2’s motives if (ε1,ε2) ∈ ξ2. U1 is
more eﬃcient but does not have the superior productivity to attract D2 when U1,D1
integrate in ξ2. Lemma 4 suggests D2 extends a compatibility contract to U2 if U1,D1
integrate in ξ2. We deﬁne the strategic region Λ1 as
Λ1 = {(ε1,ε2) : ε1 +
µ
β − µ
ε2 ≤ X1(β,µ)} where
X1(β,µ) =
τ(γ(1)) − γ(1) − (1 + β)τ(γ(β−1)) + 2γ(β−1)
β − µ
and
ξ2 = {(ε1,ε2) : (ε1,ε2) ∈ R3 & (ε1,ε2) / ∈ R2}
Theorem 2 summarizes the the ﬁrms’ strategies employed if (ε1,ε2) ∈ ξ2.
Theorem 2. Assume that
(A1) No counter merger
(A2) No horizontal merger of downstream ﬁrms
If (ε1,ε2) ∈ ξ2,then U1 and D1 merge if and only if (ε1,ε2) ∈ Λ1. D2 will be supplied by
U2. Otherwise, U1 and D1 remains independently owned. D1 and D2 will be supplied by
U1.
The strategic region Λ1 deﬁnes the region in which the total gain of both U1,D1 from
integration is suﬃciently large. Theorem 2 partitions the region ξ2 into two strategic
regions. In the ﬁrst region , Λ1 ∩ ξ2, U1 and D1 integrate even though D2 chooses to be
supplied by U2 post integration. The reason is the gain due to U1’s higher investment for
D1 after integration being more than U1’s cost of loosing D2’s business. In second region,
U1 and D1 forego integration, mostly because it is more costly for U1 not to acquire a
contractual relation with D2.
As a result, U1,D1 integrate U2’s eﬃciency ε2 is signiﬁcantly low. On the other hand,
U1 is reluctant to integrate for high values of ε2 because D2 would switch its complementary
good supplier in case of integration. Hence, U1,D1 integration has two opposite eﬀects
on upstream division U2’s proﬁt. Positive eﬀect is the bilateral gain due to higher variety.
Negative eﬀect is the loss of a potential business that would be acquired in case U1 remains
independent.
To sum up, U1,D1 always integrate whenever U2 can not provide the required com-
petition to lower the integrated ﬁrm’s proﬁt. Intuitively, U1,D1 always integrate if Uv
1D1
23has no incentive to accept a compatibility contract from D2. Meanwhile, U1 can forego
integration even if Uv
1D1 is willing to supply D2. D2’s supplier decision heavily depends
on the eﬃcient asymmetry between upstream suppliers. Uv
1D1 will not be oﬀered a com-
patibility contract by D2 in ξ2 although U1’s best interest is to supply D2. U1,D1 may
forego integration because of the competitive eﬀect post integration.
The threshold values (ε1,ε2) which partitions the strategic regions heavily depends on
the sensitivity of D1’s proﬁts to D2’s variety (i.e. µ). The more sensitive the proﬁts are,
the more eﬃcient U1 should be in order to sustain a contractual relation equilibrium.23.
Consequently, if µ is initially large, increasing µ makes U1,D1 integration more likely.
On the other hand, if µ is not high, then increasing µ makes X1(µ,β) closer to zero,
and the region Λ1 ∩ ξ2 shrinks.24 That’s why, U1,D1 integration will be less likely to
observe as an equilibrium outcome. In this case, D1 is always eager to integrate, however
U1 would not integrate because the opportunity cost of loosing D2’s business is higher
than the bilateral gain due to integration. For this reason, there is no general relationship
between µ and integration decision if (ε1,ε2) ∈ ξ2.
Moreover, U1,D1 integration decision also depends on how sensitive U0
1s proﬁts to
D1’s variety (i.e. β). If β is high. U1’s optimal investment and the variety of D2 and
increases, that’s why U1 will be less willing to integrate. In this case, U1,D1 integrate
if U1’s eﬃciency is not high so that the loss of D2’s business does not harm U1’s proﬁts
signiﬁcantly.
The last strategic region to analyze is the region in which U2 has the eﬃciency ad-
vantage. U1,D1’s integration decision do not alter D2’ incentives. Lemma 1 states, D1
and D2 extends contracts to U2 when U1,D1 do not integrate and lemma 4 states that
D1 will be compatible with U1 while D2 extends a contract to U2 when U1,D1 integrate,
if (ε1,ε2) ∈ ξ3. We deﬁne the strategic region Λ2 as
Λ2 = {(ε1,ε2) : ε1 − αε2 ≥ X2(α)} where
X2(α) = (1 − β)τ(γ(β−1)) − τ(γ(1)) + γ(1) and
ξ3 = {(ε1,ε2) : (ε1,ε2) / ∈ R3}
Theorem 3 summarizes the ﬁrm’s strategies employed if (ε1,ε2) ∈ ξ3
Theorem 3. Assume that
(A1) No counter merger
(A2) No horizontal merger of downstream ﬁrms
If (ε1,ε2) ∈ ξ3,then U1 and D1 merge if and only if (ε1,ε2) ∈ Λ2. D2 will be supplied by
23The slope of the inequality ε1 +
µ
β−µε2 ≤ X1(β,µ) increases as the value X1(β,µ) if we increase µ
24X1(β,µ) is a decreasing function of µ.
24U2. Otherwise, U1 and D1 remains independently owned. D1 and D2 will be supplied by
U2.
D1’s best interest is always to integrate if U1 has the eﬃciency advantage (i.e (ε1,ε2) ∈
ξ1 ∪ ξ2). If U1,D1’s decision is not to integrate in the equilibrium, the only reason is the
U1’s cost of loosing D2’s business in ξ1 ∪ ξ2. On the other hand, D2’s best interest is
not always to integrate if U2 has the eﬃciency advantage(i.e. (ε1,ε2) ∈ ξ3). Not being
supplied by the more eﬃcient upstream ﬁrm U2 may harm D1’s proﬁts, especially when
its downstream competitor D2 will be supplied by U2.
Unlike D1, D1’s best interest may not be always to integrate if U1 has the eﬃciency
advantage (i.e (ε1,ε2) ∈ ξ1∪ξ2) because of the cost of integration to U1. However, D2’s best
interest is always to integrate if U2 has the eﬃciency advantage(i.e. (ε1,ε2) ∈ ξ3). U1 can
supply to any of the downstream ﬁrms unless U1,D1 integrate because both downstream
ﬁrms extend a contract to U2 under contractual relations.
Theorem 3 partitions ξ3 into two strategic regions. Λ2 deﬁnes the region in which both
U1’s and D1’s best interest is to integrate in ξ3. U1,D1’s integration causes U1 to invest
more for D1, that’s why the downstream division D1 may increase proﬁt of Uv
1D1.
Moreover, theorem 3 states that U1,D1’s integration is more likely when βis small
enough (or α = 1 − β is big enough). As βbecomes smaller, the strategic region Λ2
shrinks.25. We can deﬁne the value of the sensitivity of U1’s proﬁts to D1’s variety (β∗) so
that for every βless tan β∗, U1,D1 integration is less likely if (ε1,ε2) ∈ ξ3. β∗ solves the
equation X2(1−β∗) = 0. An immediate result is; U1,D1’s integration is more likely if βis
big enough. 26. That’s why there exists a critical eﬃciency parameter ε∗
2 which necessarily
implies U1,D1’s integration decision.
Corollary 1. Assume that
(A1) No counter merger
(A2) No horizontal merger of downstream ﬁrms





In conclusion, this section summarizes the ﬁrms’ strategies under the conditions that
no counter merger and no horizontal merger of downstream ﬁrms is allowed. The (ε1,ε2)
parameter space is partitioned into ﬁve strategic regions in which U1,D1 integrate or do no
integrate in equilibrium. U1,D1 integration becomes more likely as ε1 increases whenever
ε1 > ε2 and ε1 is not close to ε2. In addition, U1,D1 integration becomes less likely as ε1
increases whenever ε2 > ε1 and ε1 is signiﬁcantly smaller than ε2. Figure 4 illustrates the
25X2 is a decreasing function of β
26If β = 1, then Λ2 is characterized by ε1− ≥ X2(0). Then, Λ2 is the whole (ε1,ε2) parameter space
since X2(0) < 0
25predictions of Theorems 1,2 and 3. The next section will analyze D1’s and U1’s integration
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Figure 4: U1,D1 Integration Decision with No Counter Merger.
5 Endogenous Integration with Counter Integration of Ri-
vals
In this section, I study U1,D1’s integration decision if U2,D2 can counter integrate as a
reaction when U1,D1 integrate. I am going to assume that,without loss of generality, D1’s
ﬁrst choice to integrate is always U1 instead of U2.
I use backward induction to analyze D1’s and D2’s endogenous integration decisions.
At time three, each independent downstream ﬁrm shares its marginal proﬁt with its com-
patible upstream ﬁrm. However, an integrated downstream division is supplied by the
integrated upstream division and the joint proﬁt is maximized by a central management.
If U1 and D1 integrate, then an integrated U2 invests to solve
max
r2
π + ε2 + τ(r2) − µ(ε1 + τ(r∗
1)) − r2






(r2) − 1 = 0
26U2,D2 counter integration aﬀects U2’s investment incentives. U2 invests r∗
2 = γ(β−1).
Lemma 2 states that U2 also invests r∗
1 = γ(β−1).
Lemma 5. Assume that
(A1) U1 and D1 merge
(A2) U2 and D2 merge
Both upstream divisions invest r∗ = γ(β−1).
I now examine the equilibrium U2 and D2’s counter integration decision when U1 and
D1 are integrated. U2,D2 counter integrate if and only if the stand alone proﬁts are less
than an integrated ﬁrm’s proﬁts.
ΠUv
2D2 > Π(D2) + Π(U2)
U1,D1 integration aﬀects both D2’s and U2’s gain in the three strategic regions ξ1,ξ2
and ξ3 diﬀerently.
First, I examine the equilibrium U2 and D2’s counter integration decision if (ε1,ε2) ∈
ξ1. Lemma 4 states that D2 extends a contract to Uv
1D1 and lemma 3 states that Uv
1D1
accepts the contract if U1,D1 integrate and D2 remains independent in ξ1. U2 supplies
to the market if and only if D2 and U2 integrate in ξ1. That’s why U2 always prefers
a counter integration. On the other hand, D2’s ex post gain can be negative because it
might be better for D2 to be compatible with the more eﬃcient upstream unit U1 which
might increase D2’s proﬁts. That’s why D2 and U2 might forego counter integration. If
we deﬁne the strategic regions C1 and CM1 as







− τ(γ((β − µ)−1))}
CM1 = {(ε1,ε2) : (ε1,ε2) ∈ C1 ∩ ξ1}
Following lemma summarizes the equilibrium U2 and D2’s counter integration decision
if (ε1,ε2) ∈ ξ1 when U1,D1 integrate.
Lemma 6. Assume that
(A1) U1 and D1 merge
If (ε1,ε2) ∈ ξ1, U2 and D2 integrate if and only if (ε1,ε2) ∈ CM1
Lemma 6 states that U2’s gain is not adequate for D2 to integrate with U2 if (ε1,ε2)
is not in the parameter space CM1. CM1 is the strategic regions in which U2,D2 counter
integrate when U1,D1 integrate. A larger variety sensitivity β makes U2,D2 counter
integration more likely. The main reason is a bugger U2,D2 bilateral gain when U1,D1
27integrate because an independent D2’s contract fee βv2 increases with a larger β. Lemma
6 also states that there exists always a strategic region CM1 in ξ1.
Second, I examine the equilibrium U2 and D2’s counter integration decision if (ε1,ε2) ∈
ξ2 and (ε1,ε2) ∈ ξ3. In these two strategic regions, D2 is going to be supplied by U2 even
if D2 remains independent. Counter integration with U2 is always a weakly dominant
strategy for D2 because investment decision made by a central management necessarily
increases the joint proﬁts when U1,D1 integrate.
Π(Uv
2D2) ≥ Π(D2;U2) + Π(U2;D2) if (ε1,ε2) ∈ (ξ2 ∪ ξ3)
Next lemma summarizes the equilibrium U2 and D2’s counter integration decision if
(ε1,ε2) ∈ ξ2 and (ε1,ε2) ∈ ξ3
Lemma 7. Assume that
(A1) U1 and D1 merge
U2 and D2 integrate if (ε1,ε2) ∈ (ξ2 ∪ ξ3)
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Figure 5: U2,D2 Counter Integration Decision when U1,D1 Integrate with No Horizontal
Merger
Up to this point, I have not discussed the equilibrium integration decision of U1,D1.
D1’s decision to integrate can be altered when U2,D2 counter merger is possible because
downstream variety of D2 increases when U2,D2 integrate.
First, I examine U1,D1 integration decision when D2 would not integrate with U2 when
U1,D1 integrate. Intuitively, D1’s best interest is to integrate with U1 because vertical
28integration would not lead to a counter integration. Theorem 1 claims U1,D1 integrate
if (ε1,ε2) ∈ ξ1. In other words, U1,D0
1s bilateral gain is positive in ξ1. In particular,
D1’s best choice does not alter if D2 would integrate with U2. Another reason is that
the eﬃciency diﬀerence between upstream producers is adequately high so that D2 prefers
being independent rather than counter integration. Theorem 4 summarizes the equilibrium
integration decision of U1,D1 if U2,D2 would not integrate.
Theorem 4. Assume that
(A1) No horizontal merger of D1,D2 is allowed
If (ε1,ε2) ∈ ξ1 and (ε1,ε2) / ∈ CM1 , U1 and D1 integrate and D2 remain independently
owned. D2 is supplied by upstream division U1.
Note that U1,D1’s integration decision does not have any aﬀect on D2’s incentives.
The main reason is the upstream eﬃciency asymmetry. In this case, U2 can not compete
with U1 even though U1 would invest less for D2. As a result, D2 will be supplied by
Uv
1D1 in equilibrium.
Second, I examine U1,D1 integration decision when D2 would not integrate with U2
when U1,D1 integrate and U1 is more eﬃcient than U2 (i.e., (ε1,ε2) ∈ CM1 ∪ xi2). Al-
though CM1 and ξ2 has diﬀerent strategic implications when U2,D2 integration is not
allowed, CM1 and ξ2 has the same strategic implications when when U2,D2 integration
is allowed. U2,D2 would counter integrate when U1,D1 integrate if U1 does not have
adequate eﬃciency advantage even though U1 is more eﬃcient than U2. U2,D2 counter
integration decision can threat the proﬁts of Uv
1D1. Thus, D1 and U1 may forego vertical
integration. If we deﬁne the strategic regions TM1 and T1 as





(1 − µ)(τ(γ(1)) − τ(γ(β−1))) − γ(1) − βτ(γ((β − µ)−1)) + 2γ((β − µ)−1)
β − µ
}
TM1 = {(ε1,ε2) : (ε1,ε2) ∈ T1 ∩ (CM1 ∪ ξ2)}
Theorem 5 summarizes the equilibrium strategies employer by the ﬁrms.
Theorem 5. Assume that
(A1) No horizontal merger of D1,D2 is allowed
If (ε1,ε2) ∈ CM1 ∩ ξ2 , U1 and D1 integrate and U2,D2 integrate if and only if (ε1,ε2) ∈
TM1.
Otherwise, ﬁrms remain contractual relations. D1 and D2 is supplied by U1.
Theorem 5 partitions the strategic region CM1∩ξ2 into two. The ﬁrst partition is TM1.
Even though U2,D2 counter integration is a threat to Uv
1D1, U1,D1 integrates in TM1.
29As a result, two vertical integrations will be observed in the market. On the other hand,
both D1’s and U1 loss is higher than a possible bilateral gain from integration whenever
(ε1,ε2) ∈ CM1 ∪ ξ2 but (ε1,ε2) / ∈ TM1. Consequently, neither of the downstream ﬁrms
integrates with an upstream ﬁrm.
The likelihood of a independent ownership increases as U2’s eﬃciency increases in ξ2.
First reason is that D1 would loose more downstream proﬁts for higher eﬃciencies of U2
when U1,D1 and U2,D2 integrate. Second reason is that an independent U1 would acquire
the business of an independent D2. Post integrations, D2 will be supplied by U2. Theorem
5 and theorem 4 state that U1,D1 never integrate if U1 is signiﬁcantly eﬃcient but not
too eﬃcient so that D2 would not counter integrate. (i.e., min(G1(β,µ,S2(β,µ))) < ε1 <
S1(β,µ))
Furthermore, U1,D1 integration decision under possibility of a counter integration
depends on how sensitive the proﬁts to variety and downstream competition. Uv
1D1 would
loose downstream proﬁts when U2,D2 if the downstream market is highly competitive,
while independent D1 and U1 would not be hurt as much by a high competitive downstream
market since D2 would not counter integrate and increase its variety. Thus, a large µ value
makes independent ownership more likely and U1,D1 and U2,D2 integrations less likely.
In addition, an independent U1 would loose a signiﬁcant amount of upstream proﬁts if
the upstream proﬁts are signiﬁcantly sensitive to downstream variety. The main reason
is that U1 would supply both downstream ﬁrms under contractual relations, while U1
would supply only D1 if both downstream ﬁrms integrate.27 Consequently, a higher β
value makes independent ownership more likely and U1,D1 and U2,D2 integrations less
likely. In general, the ﬁndings support the immediate intuitive sense that it is less likely
for an upstream ﬁrm to integrate if the price for the upstream service or product is high,
upstream ﬁrm’s market share is signiﬁcantly high and upstream ﬁrm would loose some of
its customers after integration.
Third, I examine U1,D1’s integration decision when D2 would not integrate with U2
when U1,D1 integrate and U1 is less eﬃcient than U2 (i.e., (ε1,ε2)xi3). U2,D2 would
counter integrate when U1,D1 integrate especially if U1 U1 is less eﬃcient than U2. U2,D2
counter integration decision also threats the proﬁts of Uv
1D1. Thus, D1 and U1 may forego
vertical integration in ξ3. If we deﬁne the strategic regions TM2 and T2 as
T2 = {(ε1,ε2) : ε1 − (1 − β)ε2 ≤ S3(β,µ) where
S3(β,µ) = (1 − β)(τ(γ((β − µ)−1)) − τ(γ(1)) + γ(1)) − βτ(γ((β − µ)−1))}
ξ3 = {(ε1,ε2) : (ε1,ε2) / ∈ R3}
TM2 = {(ε1,ε2) : (ε1,ε2) ∈ T2 ∩ ξ3)}
27If β = 1, U1 would never integrate with D1 in ξ2
30Theorem 6 summarizes the equilibrium strategies employed by the ﬁrms in ξ3.
Theorem 6. Assume that
(A1) No horizontal merger of D1,D2 is allowed
If (ε1,ε2) ∈ ξ3 , U1 and D1 integrate and U2,D2 integrate if and only if (ε1,ε2) ∈ TM2.
Otherwise, ﬁrms remain contractual relations. D1 and D2 is supplied by U2.
Theorem 6 states that there exits a strategic region TM2 in ξ3 in which both down-
stream ﬁrms integrate with an upstream ﬁrm. Theorem 6 also states that there exists a
strategic region in ξ3 in which ﬁrms maintain their contractual relations and both down-
stream ﬁrms are supplied by the more eﬃcient upstream ﬁrm U2.
D1 would be supplied by the more eﬃcient upstream ﬁrm U2, whereas U1 would not
supply to any of the downstream ﬁrms under independent ownership. That’s why, U1 is
always willing to integrate unlike D1 which may prefer being independent. D1 has no
incentive to integrate whenever U2 has a signiﬁcant eﬃciency advantage. Consequently, a
higher eﬃciency value ε2 makes independent ownership more likely and U1,D1 and U2,D2
integrations less likely. However, theorem 6 states that U1,D1 always integrates if U2 is
not eﬃcient enough in ξ3 (i.e. ε2 <
S3(β,µ)
1−β ) and U2,D2 counter integrate.
U1,D1 integration decision under possibility of a counter integration depends on how
sensitive the proﬁts to variety and downstream competition in ξ3 similar to the other
strategic regions. As the sensitivity measure β becomes large, D1 must incur a higher cost
to be compatible with U2.28 Thus, a higher β value makes U1,D1 and U2,D2 integration
more likely and independent ownership less likely. In addition, D1 would know that D2
would be also supplied by U2 if U1,D1 integrates. A higher competition would hurt the
downstream proﬁts of Uv
1D1 more because Uv
2D2 will have a higher variety in ξ3. Conse-
quently, a higher µ value makes U1,D1 and U2,D2 integration less likely and independent
ownership more likely.
In conclusion, theorems 4 through 6 summarize the endogenous integration decision
of U1,D1 and U2,D2 yet the equilibrium decision is conditional on not allowing a hori-
zontal merger of D1,D2. The ﬁgure illustrates the model’s predictions. The next section
summarizes and concludes.
6 Conclusion
The goal of this paper is to investigate the endogenous integration decision of ﬁrms in
complementary market setting such that a downstream ﬁrm must commit to a compat-
ibility contract with one of the complementary good producers. Post contractibg, the
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Figure 6: Integration Decisions of U1,D1 and U2,D2 with No Horizontal Merger
complementary good producers invest on ﬁrm speciﬁc R&D. I have identiﬁed the con-
ditions under which integration with a complementary good producer and/or a counter
merger of is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium organizational form.
In following sections, I examine the conditional endogenous integration decision when
a counter merger is not allowed. The ﬁrst section analyzes the integration decision of
ﬁrms when a horizontal merger is assumed away. Matutes&Regibeau(1998), Beggs(1994),
Heavner(2004) are some examples of the literature which assumes the vertical integration
option and assumes away a counter merger option.
The las section examines the unconditional endogenous integration decision when a
counter merger is also allowed. Chen(2001), McAfee(1999)are some examples of the lit-
erature which assumes the vertical integration and counter integration and assumes away
a horizontal merger option. An extension model can analyze the case when horizontal
merger is also allowed.29 The paper presents the model’s predictions and claims that each
of diﬀerent organizational forms may be the equilibrium outcome. The paper provides a
theory base for Economides & Salop(1992) which assumes diﬀerent organizational forms.
To be speciﬁc, when U1 has a high eﬃciency superiority(ε1 >> ε2), vertical integration
will always occur in absence of a horizontal merger option. Vertical integration changes
the integrated ﬁrm’s incentives to invest for its’ downstream rival. The independent base
product ﬁrm will be less apt to be compatible with the integrated ﬁrm post integration.
Thus, the integration may not occur whenever the eﬃciency of the integrated ﬁrm is
inadequate. Moreover, the base product ﬁrm may merge with its substitute good producer
and forego vertical integration if we introduce horizontal merger as an alternative. Both
29Cakirer(2006)
32of the upstream ﬁrms can supply variety to the market post merger, although the total
variety will be less.
The model’s extended predictions suggest that the counter merger may be more likely
if variety competition is ﬁerce when D1 and D2 can merge. Moreover, merger with sub-
stitute good producer is more likely whenever the rival downstream ﬁrm would not be
compatible with the integrated ﬁrm in case of integration. On the other hand, the higher
share the downstream gets from the proﬁts generated by the variety eﬀects, the more likely
vertical integration to occur. If the variety competition is not ﬁerce enough(α > 2µ), in-
dependent ownership can not be sustained whenever U1 has an eﬃciency advantage. In
addition, independent ownership can not be a sustainable market structure whenever U2
has the eﬃciency advantage and the competition is not ﬁerce enough (α < 2µ). Nev-
ertheless, the ﬁrms can stay independent for some eﬃciency levels even if both vertical
integration and counter merger are available. In contrast to existing literature which takes
the merger decision of the ﬁrm for granted, this paper suggests that some type of mergers
are more likely than others in complementary markets under the factors such as degree of
competition and distribution of the proﬁt increment due to the externality eﬀect.
The theory presented in this dissertation can provide a basis for a possible empirical
work on mergers in complementary markets. One can use the ﬁxed eﬀect model of endoge-
nous integration to estimate the eﬃciency values utilizing the available data on variety
of a product. The proﬁts also can be structured and estimated as a function of both the
ﬁrm’s variety and the rival’s variety. One can observe the diﬀerent kind of mergers and
argue whether the predictions of this paper prevail or not. Further research is needed to
test the predictions of the model. Moreover, one can investigate the eﬀect of a pre-existing
vertical merger on a horizontal merger and vice versa. Following the idea, one can investi-
gate combination of mergers in complementary markets in a dynamic setting. The model
also lacks a complete welfare analysis post merger. One can work work on a model which
analyzes the welfare eﬀects when the ﬁrm is supported with variety of complementary
products using the paper as the model’s basis.
33Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
If D1,D2,U1 and U2 are independent, then their proﬁts are going to be
Π(U1) =(λ1 + λ2)(β(ε1 + τ(γ(β−1))) − γ(β−1))
Π(U2) =(2 − λ1 − λ2)(β(ε2 + τ(γ(β−1))) − γ(β−1))
Π(Di) =π + α(λiε1 + (1 − λi)ε2 + τ(γ(β−1)))
− µ(λjε1 + (1 − λj)ε2 + τ(γ(β−1)))
If we compare the proﬁts of a downstream ﬁrm when Di is supplied by U1 (i.e. λ1 = 1)
and Di is supplied by U2 (i.e. λ1 = 0) then,
Π(Di;Ui) > Π(Di;Uj) ⇔ εi > εj
A downstream ﬁrm maximizes its proﬁt by oﬀering a contract to the upstream ﬁrm which
is more eﬃcient.
Proof of Lemma 2
When β > µ,the ﬁrst order conditions satisfy
∂Π
∂r11




= (β − µ)τ0(r12) − 1 = 0 ⇒ r∗
12 = τ0−1((β − µ)−1)
If β > µ, the upstream division of the integrated ﬁrm Uv
1D1 would invest r∗
11 = γ((1)) and
r∗
12 = γ((β − µ)−1).
Proof of Lemma 3
If β > µ, the integrated ﬁrm’s upstream division Uv






1D1;D2) = π + (ε1 + τ(γ((1)))) − γ((1)) + (β − µ)(ε1 + τ(γ((β − µ)−1))) − γ((β − µ)−1)
Π(Uv
1D1) = π + (ε1 + τ(γ((1)))) − γ((1)) + −µ(ε2 + τ(γ(β−1)))
Then, Uv

















− τ(γ((β − µ)−1)) < 0 ⇔
γ((β − µ)−1) − µτ(γ(β−1)) − (β − µ)(τ(γ((β − µ)−1))) < 0
But we know that if x > 0 then βτ(x) > x, otherwise an upstream ﬁrm would invest zero
and maximize the variety.Hence,
γ((β − µ)−1) − βτ(γ((β − µ)−1)) < 0 and
µ[(τ(γ((β − µ)−1)) − τ(γ(β−1))] < τ(γ((β − µ)−1)) − τ(γ(β−1)) < 0 then




β−µ − τ(γ((β − µ)−1)) < 0
If β < µ, if the integrated ﬁrm decides to supply, the ﬁrm maximizes the total gain from
accepting the compatibility contract. Thus, the integrated ﬁrm’s problem is to maximize
the gain if integrated ﬁrm is compatible with the independent base product ﬁrm.
max
r12
(β − µ)(ε1 + τ(r∗
12)) − r∗
12
Since β − µ < 0, the gain is maximized if and only if the ﬁrm produces the minimum
amount of variety for its rival. Hence,the optimal level of investment for its rival base
product ﬁrm will be
τ(r∗
12) = 0 ⇐⇒ r∗
12 = 0
If we plug the optimal level of investment, the integrated ﬁrm agrees on a compatibility
contract if




ε2 ≤ F2(µ,β) = −
µτ(γ(β−1))
β − µ
such that F2(µ,β) = −
µτ(γ(β−1))
β−µ > 0 since β − µ < 0.
Proof of Lemma 4
The independent downstream ﬁrm oﬀers the compatibility contract to the upstream di-
vision of the integrated ﬁrm if the gain from the contract is higher than the downstream
ﬁrm’s gain from its outside option. D2 oﬀers a compatibility contract to Uv




35If β > µ
Π(D2;Uv
1D1) = π + (1 − β)(ε1 + τ(γ((β − µ)−1))) − µ(ε1 + τ(γ((1))))
Π(D2;U2) = π + ((1 − β)(ε2 + τ(γ(β−1))) − µ(ε1 + τ(γ((1)))))
If β < µ
Π(D2;Uv
1D1) = π + (1 − β)(ε1) − µ(ε1 + τ(γ((1))))
Π(D2;U2) = π + ((1 − β)(ε2 + τ(γ(β−1))) − µ(ε1 + τ(γ((1)))))
Then,D2 oﬀers a compatibility contract to Uv
1D1 if and only if
ε1 + τ(γ((β − µ)−1)) > ε2 + τ(γ(β−1)) if β > µ
ε1 > ε2 + τ(γ(β−1)) if β < µ
or
ε1 − ε2 ≥ G1(β,µ) if β > µ
ε1 − ε2 ≥ G2(β) if β < µ7
,where
G1(β,µ) = τ(γ(β−1)) − τ(γ((β − µ)−1)) (9)
G2(β) = τ(γ(β−1)) (10)
,and τ(γ(β−1)) > τ(γ(β−1)) − τ(γ((β − µ)−1)) > 0
Proof of Theorem 1
The strategic region ξ1 is deﬁned by ξ1 = {(ε1,ε2) : ε1 − ε2 ≥ G1(β,µ) = τ(γ(β−1)) −
τ(γ((β−µ)−1))}. If (ε1,ε2) ∈ ξ1, lemma 4 states that both independent downstream ﬁrms
would be supplied by U1 when U1,D1 do not integrate and D2 would be supplied by Uv
1D1
when U1,D1 integrate. U1D1 integrate if and only if
Π(Uv
1D1;D2) ≥ Π(D1;U1) + Π(U1;D1,D2)
If U1 and D1 remain independently owned then the proﬁts of the ﬁrms will be,
Π(D1;U1) = π + (1 − β)(ε1 + τ(γ(β−1))) − µ(ε1 + τ(γ(β−1)))
Π(U1;D1,D2) = 2(β(ε1 + τ(γ(β−1))) − γ(β−1))
When U1,D1 integrate, the proﬁt function of the integrated ﬁrm will be,
Π(Uv
1D1) = π + ε1 + τ(γ(1)) + (β − µ)(ε1 + τ(γ((β − µ)−1))) − γ(1) − γ((β − µ)−1)
36U1,D1 integrate if the total proﬁt is higher than the sum of the two independent ﬁrms’
proﬁts.
Π(Uv
1D1;D2) ≥ Π(D1;U1) + Π(U1;D1,D2) ⇔
π + ε1 + τ(γ(1)) + (β − µ)(ε1 + τ(γ((β − µ)−1))) − γ(1) − γ((β − µ)−1)
≥ π + ε1 + τ(γ(β−1)) + (β − µ)(ε1 + τ(γ(β−1))) − 2γ(β−1) (11)
⇔ τ(γ(1)) + (β − µ)(τ(γ((β − µ)−1))) − 2τ(γ(β−1)) ≥ γ((β − µ)−1) + γ(1) − 2γ(β−1)
Since Uv
1D1 optimizes its proﬁt, it must be true that
τ(γ(1)) − γ(1) > τ(γ(β−1)) − γ(β−1) and
(β − µ)(τ(γ((β − µ)−1))) − γ((β − µ)−1) > (β − µ)τ(γ(β−1)) − γ(β−1)
The inequalities imply that inequality 11 holds. Thus, U1,D1 vertically integrate for
∀(β,µ) and (ε1,ε2) ∈ ξ1.
Proof of Theorem 2
The strategic region ξ2 is deﬁned by ξ2 = {(ε1,ε2) : (ε1,ε2) ∈ R3 and (ε1,ε2) / ∈ R2}.
If (ε1,ε2) ∈ ξ2, lemma 4 states that both independent downstream ﬁrms would be sup-
plied by U1 when U1,D1 do not integrate and D2 would be supplied by U2 when U1,D1
integrate. U1D1 integrate if and only if
Π(Uv
1D1) ≥ Π(D1;U1) + Π(U1;D1,D2)
If the ﬁrms remain independently owned, the proﬁt functions of the upstream ﬁrm and
the downstream ﬁrm will be
Π(D1;U1) = π + (1 − β)(ε1 + τ(γ(β−1))) − µ(ε1 + τ(γ(β−1)))
Π(U1;D1,D2) = 2(β(ε1 + τ(γ(β−1))) − γ(β−1))
If U1,D1 integrate, the integrated ﬁrm will not earn proﬁts surplus by supplying for its
downstream rival. Post merger, the proﬁt function of the integrated ﬁrm will be,
Π(Uv
1D1) = π + ε1 + τ(γ(1)) − γ(1) − µ(ε2 + τ(γ(β−1)))
U1,D1 integrate if and only if there is a positive gain,
Π(Uv
1D1) ≥ Π(D1;U1) + Π(U1;D1,D2) ⇔
π + ε1 + τ(γ(1)) − γ(1) − µ(ε2 + τ(γ(β−1))) ≥ π + (1 + β − µ)(ε1 + τ(γ(β−1))) − 2γ(β−1)
⇔ (β − µ)ε1 + µε2 ≤ τ(γ(1)) γ(1) − (1 + β)τ(γ(β−1)) + 2γ(β−1) = Xm
1 (β)
37We can deﬁne X1(β,µ) =
Xm
1 (β)





1 (β) ≥ Fm(β,µ) ⇔ (12)
τ(γ(1)) − γ(1) − (1 + β)τ(γ(β−1)) + 2γ(β−1) ≥ γ((β − µ)−1) − µτ(γ(β−1)) − (β − µ)τ(γ((β − µ)−1))
⇔ τ(γ(1)) − γ(1) − (1 + β − µ)τ(γ(β−1)) + 2βγ(β−1) + (β − µ)τ(γ((β − µ)−1)) − γ((β − µ)−1) ≥ 0
We know that the integrated ﬁrm optimizes the investment levels for each downstream
ﬁrm.Thus,
τ(γ(1)) − γ(1) ≥ τ(γ(β−1)) − γ(β−1)
(β − µ)τ(γ((β − µ)−1)) − γ((β − µ)−1) ≥ (β − µ)τ(γ(β−1)) − γ(β−1)
Rearranging the two inequalities,
τ(γ(1)) − γ(1) + (β − µ)τ(γ((β − µ)−1)) − γ((β − µ)−1) ≥ (1 + β − µ)τ(γ(β−1)) − 2βγ(β−1)
⇒ Xm
1 (β) ≥ Fm(β,µ)
Xm
1 (β) ≥ Fm(β,µ) ⇔ X1(β,µ) ≥ F1(β,µ)






τ(γ(1)) − γ(1) − (1 + β)τ(γ(β−1)) + 2γ(β−1)
β − µ
,when (ε1,ε2) ∈ ξ2.
Proof of Theorem 3
The strategic region ξ3 is deﬁned by ξ3 = {(ε1,ε2) : (ε1,ε2) ∈ ε1−ε2 < 0}. If (ε1,ε2) ∈ ξ3,
lemma 4 states that both independent downstream ﬁrms would be supplied by U2 when
U1,D1 do not integrate and D2 would be supplied by U2 when U1,D1 integrate. U1D1
integrate if and only if
Π(Uv
1D1) ≥ Π(D1;U2)
When the ﬁrms stay independent, the proﬁt functions of the ﬁrms will be
Π(D1;U2) = π + (1 − β)(ε2 + τ(γ(β−1))) − µ(ε2 + τ(γ(β−1)))
Π(U1) = 0
If the integration occurs, the proﬁt function of the integrated ﬁrm will be,
Π(Uv
1D1) = π + ε1 + τ(γ(1)) − γ(1) − µ(ε2 + τ(γ(β−1)))
38The integration takes place if and only if it is proﬁtable for both parties.
That is, Π(Uv
1D1) ≥ Π(D1;U2) ⇔
π + ε1 + τ(γ(1)) − γ(1) − µ(ε2 + τ(γ(β−1))) ≥ π + (1 − β − µ)(ε2 + τ(γ(β−1)))
⇔ ε1 − (1 − β)ε2 ≥ (1 − β)τ(γ(β−1)) − τ(γ(1)) + γ(1)
If we deﬁne X2(α) = (1 − β)τ(γ(β−1)) − τ(γ(1)) + γ(1)
Moreover X2(α) < G1(β,µ).
X2(α) < G1(β,µ) ⇔
(1 − β)(τ(γ(β−1)) − τ(γ(1)) − γ(1) < τ(γ(β−1)) − τ(γ((β − µ)−1)))
We know that
τ(γ(1)) − γ(1) > τ(γ((β − µ)−1)) − γ((β − µ)−1) and
βτ(γ(β−1)) > βτ(γ((β − µ)−1)) > γ((β − µ)−1) since γ((β − µ)−1) > 0
Rearranging the inequalities, we get G1(β,µ) > X2(β).
U1,D1 vertically integrate if (ε1,ε2) ∈ Λ2 ∩ ξ3 where,
Λ2 = {(ε1,ε2) : ε1 − (1 − β)ε2 ≥ X2(β)}
X2(β) = (1 − β)τ(γ(β−1)) − τ(γ(1)) + γ(1)




ε1 − (1 − β)ε∗




β−1 solves the equations. By theorem 3, any ε2 which is less than ε∗
2 lead to
U1,D1 integration.
Proof of Lemma 5
Follows from lemma 2.
Proof of Lemma 6
39If (ε1,ε2) ∈ ξ1, an independent D2 would be supplied by Uv
1D1 when U2,D2 do not inte-
grate. U2D2 integrate if and only if Π(Dv
2U2) ≥ Π(D2;Uv
1D1) + Π(U2).
The proﬁts of Uv
2D2 when U2,D2 integrate and U2 and D2 when U2,D2 do not integrate
are
Π(Dv
2U2) = π + ε2 + τ(γ((1))) − µ(ε1 + τ(γ((1)))) − γ((1))
Π(D2;Uv




1D1) + Π(U2) if and only if
(1 − β)ε1 − ε2 ≤ τ(γ(1)) − ατ(γ((β − µ)−1)) − γ(1)
Then,U2,D2 counter integrate when U1,D1 integrate in ξ1 if (ε1,ε2) ∈ CM1 where,







− τ(γ((β − µ)−1))}
CM1 = {(ε1,ε2) : (ε1,ε2) ∈ C1 ∩ ξ1}
Proof of Theorem 4
If (ε1,ε2) ∈ ξ1 and (ε1,ε2) / ∈ CM1 , theorem 1 states U1,D1 integrate if there was no
counter merger. In equilibrium, lemma 7 states U2,D2 would not integrate even if U2,D2
integration is possible. Hence, U1,D1 integrate and D2 remain independently owned and
is supplied by Uv
1D1 in the equilibrium.
Proof of Theorem 5
If (ε1,ε2) ∈ CM1 ∪ ξ2, U2,D2 would counter integrate when U1,D1 integrate. D1 either
integrates with U1 or remains independently owned. D1 remains independently owned if
U2,D2 counter integration decreases U1,D1’s proﬁts. D1 would be supplied by U1 and
U1 would supply both D1 and D2 in CM1 ∪ ξ2 in case of independent ownership. U1,D1
integrate if
Π(Uv
1D1) ≥ Π(U1;D1,D2) + Π(D1;U1)
Uv
1D1 proﬁt when U1,D1 integrate and U2,D2 counter integrate is
Π(Uv
1D1) = π + ε1 + τ(γ((1))) − γ((1)) − µ(ε2 + τ(γ((1))))
40U1 and D1’s stand alone proﬁts are
Π(D1;U1) = π + (1 − β − µ)(ε1 + τ(γ(β−1)))
Π(U1;D1,D2) = 2(β(ε1 + τ(γ(β−1))) − γ(β−1)) (13)
Then U1,D1 integrate if and only if
(β −µ)ε1 +µε2 ≤ (1−µ)(τ(γ(1))−τ(γ(β−1)))−γ(1)−βτ(γ((β −µ)−1))+2γ((β −µ)−1)
Rearranging the inequality, U1,D1 integrate if and only if (ε1,ε2) ∈ TM1 where,





(1 − µ)(τ(γ(1)) − τ(γ(β−1))) − γ(1) − βτ(γ((β − µ)−1)) + 2γ((β − µ)−1)
β − µ
}
TM1 = {(ε1,ε2) : (ε1,ε2) ∈ T1 ∩ (CM1 ∪ ξ2)}
Proof of Theorem 6
If (ε1,ε2) ∈ ξ3, U2,D2 would counter integrate when U1,D1 integrate. D1 either in-
tegrates with U1 or remains independently owned. D1 remains independently owned if
U2,D2 counter integration decreases U1,D1’s proﬁts. D1 would be supplied by U2 and U1
would supply neither D1 or D2 in ξ3 in case of independent ownership. U1,D1 integrate if
Π(Uv
1D1) ≥ Π(U1) + Π(D1;U2)
Uv
1D1 proﬁt when U1,D1 integrate and U2,D2 counter integrate is
Π(Uv
1D1) = π + ε1 + τ(γ((1))) − γ((1)) − µ(ε2 + τ(γ((1))))
U1 and D1’s stand alone proﬁts are
Π(D1;U2) = π + (1 − β − µ)(ε2 + τ(γ(β−1)))
Π(U1;) = 0 (14)
Then U1,D1 integrate if and only if
ε1 − (1 − β)ε2 ≤ (1 − β)(τ(γ((β − µ)−1)) − τ(γ(1)) + γ(1)) − βτ(γ((β − µ)−1))
Rearranging the inequality, U1,D1 integrate if and only if (ε1,ε2) ∈ TM2 where,
T2 = {(ε1,ε2) : ε1 − (1 − β)ε2 ≤ S3(β,µ)} where
S3(β,µ) = (1 − β)(τ(γ((β − µ)−1)) − τ(γ(1)) + γ(1)) − βτ(γ((β − µ)−1))
ξ3 = {(ε1,ε2) : (ε1,ε2) / ∈ R3}
TM2 = {(ε1,ε2) : (ε1,ε2) ∈ T2 ∩ ξ3)}
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